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VOTING AND ELECTORAL POLITICS IN
THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT
JASON J. CZARNEZKI*
Is there any such reason for submitting the claims of two candidates
for a judgeship to a popular vote? Do we expect or desire that our
votes should influence the decisions of a judge?
-From the City of Madison's Wisconsin Argus, May 4, 1847.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In determining the selection method for state supreme court justices, states
may attempt to balance the conflicting ideals of judicial independence and
accountability.2 The debate over which judicial selection process best
achieves this balance continuously has been waged.3 Unlike the federal
process, which in order to maximize judicial independence contains no
electoral mechanisms, the Wisconsin Constitution requires its judiciary to
compete for citizen support in nonpartisan elections.4 Do these elections
undermine judicial independence by affecting the ways justices vote within
their institution?5 This very question was asked during the Wisconsin's
founding 150 years ago, but lingers today without an answer.6 The answer,
* Judicial Clerk, United States District Court (D. Me.); A.B. 2000, J.D. 2003, The University of
Chicago. Special thanks to Gerald Rosenberg for his helpful comments and advice, and thanks to
Lisa Bernstein, John Brehm, William Ford, Philip Hamburger, and the University of Chicago Legal
Scholarship Workshop. I also wish to thank Andrea Voyer-her knowledge and suggestions proved
invaluable.
1. Constitutional Principles: V The Judiciary, Wis. ARGUS (Madison, WI), June 22, 1847
[hereinafter Constitutional Principles], reprinted in THE ATTAINMENT OF STATEHOOD 34 (Milo M.
Quaife ed., 1928).
2. See Shirley Abrahamson, Speech: The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 977
(2001) (observing that judicial elections have been criticized as being at odds with the concept of
judicial independence). For a discussion of judicial selection methods, see Peter D. Webster,
Selection and Retention Methods: Is There One "Best" Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1995).
3. Abrahamson, supra note 2, at 973 (noting that the subject of how to select judges is now in
its fourth century of debate, and that discussion about the selection of state court judges is often
found in academia and the media).
4. See WiS. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
5. This question must be studied empirically to determine if selection procedures produce a
different type of judiciary. See Abrahamson, supra note 2, at 980 (stating that empirical studies have
not sufficiently demonstrated that a certain election method produces a different kind of judiciary).
6. See infra Part II.
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however, may cause states to re-evaluate their judicial selection methods
depending on whether selection methods affect judicial voting in individual
cases and may help scholars better understand the forces that exert pressure on
judicial decision-making.7
This Article examines criminal cases decided by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court over a fifteen-year period in an effort to discern whether judicial
elections undercut judicial independence by affecting the ways justices vote.
Wisconsin was chosen for this study because the state's mix of appointed and
elected judges allows a researcher to control for different judicial selection
systems. 8 Specifically, this Article questions whether voting patterns may be
affected by a justice's proximity to judicial elections, election margins, and
whether a justice was appointed or elected in the initial term, since the
governor may appoint a justice to fill a vacancy on the court.
In Part II, this Article provides a historical overview of how judicial
selection methods have been chosen in the United States and Wisconsin. Part
III examines the literature on responsiveness to the electorate, which forms
the basis for the hypotheses regarding the voting behaviors of Wisconsin
Supreme Court justices in Part IV. Part V explains the data and research
methodology for this study, while Part VI analyzes judicial voting patterns of
justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and asks whether voting patterns
may be affected by proximity to elections, election margins, and appointment
versus election in the initial term. Part VII concludes that being appointed
(versus elected) in the initial term significantly correlates with a justice's
voting for a defendant's claim in that initial term. In contrast, looking at the
overall Wisconsin Supreme Court, proximity to election has no significant
impact on judicial voting against a defendant's legal claim. However,
individual justices do display changes in voting patterns as they near re-
election. Part VIII suggests areas for further analysis and future research.
II. A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF JUDICIAL SELECTION
The political question of the effects of election on judicial decision-
7. For example, in addition to electoral pressures, judges face the pressures of their personal
policy preferences, legal rules, and other factors when making a decision. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002);
DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (2002); Jason J.
Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? (2003) (working paper on file with authors
& Marquette Law Review).
8. Wisconsin Supreme Court vacancies are filled by gubernatorial appointment, and the
appointee is required to stand for election to a full term the following spring. However, only one
supreme court judicial election can occur each year. As a result, a number of years may pass before
an appointed justice must run in an election. See WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 4, cl. 1; see also infra note
17.
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making has been debated in Wisconsin since its founding. Although the
question was first raised in 1847, it has been left unanswered for over 150
years. The framers of the Wisconsin Constitution, in deciding on an elected
judiciary, wanted to increase public participation and spark the state's
progressive tradition. 9  The constitutional drafters felt such elections,
however, would not hamper judicial independence because judges would be
elected by diverse citizens from the state at large.' 0
The framers of the U.S. Constitution were not as optimistic. They
selected an appointment process for the federal judiciary to maximize judicial
independence because the "independence of the [j]udges may be an essential
safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the society."'' The
framers of the U.S. Constitution were well aware of the dangers of an elected
federal judiciary. If popular elections were used, "there would be too great a
disposition to consult popularity," and "[p]eriodical appointments, however
regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to
their necessary independence."'' 2  Judicial appointment and permanency in
office could help ensure the court would be firm 3 and make decisions solely
based on the Constitution and the laws. 14 Election arguably "poison[s] the
fountains of justice," as judges need not have electoral face-offs decided by
citizens who cannot be anything but deficient in their knowledge of law. 
1 5
In the 1800s, states began to move toward having elected judiciaries rather
than relying on appointments by governors or legislatures.1 6 The Wisconsin
Constitution, preferring direct accountability, provides that the justices of the
supreme court be elected to ten-year terms through a state-wide election with
only one justice being elected in any one year.' 7  The Wisconsin
9. See William R. Moser, Populism, A Wisconsin Heritage: Its Effect on Judicial
Accountability in the State, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 54-55 (1982).
10. See infra text accompanying note 24.
11. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
12. Id.
13. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 79 (Alexander Hamilton).
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
16. CHARLES H. SHELDON & LINDA S. MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE RECRUITMENT OF
STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES 4 (1998) (noting that over one-half of the twenty-nine states in 1849
used popular elections for judges, and every later state admitted to the Union adopted some form of
popular election).
17. WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 4, cl. 1 reads, "The supreme court shall have 7 members who shall
be known as justices of the supreme court. Justices shall be elected for 10-year terms of office
commencing with the August 1 next succeeding election. Only one justice may be elected in any
year." This section of the Wisconsin Constitution has been amended four times (in April 1997, April
1903, April 1889, and November 1877) since its ratification on March 13, 1848 with changes in the
length of the term and the number of justices on the court. However, since 1903, justices have been
2003]
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Constitutional Convention, convened in 1847 to develop a state constitution,
engaged in heated debate on the convention floor, in the judiciary committee,
and in popular discussion when deciding whether the justices of the supreme
court should be appointed by the legislature, appointed by the governor, or
elected by the citizens.
Much of the popular press in Wisconsin preferred a system of
appointment for the state judiciary, as many thought citizens had a distinct
voice via their elected officials, and the governor or senate was best situated
to secure judicial selections. 18 The popular press saw no need to submit the
claims of two judgeship candidates to a popular vote asking, "Do we expect or
desire that our votes should influence the decisions of a judge?"'19
[I]t appears to us that to claim that the popular vote will have no
influence upon the official acts of the judge is to admit that nothing
can be gained by the elective mode in the only point where
improvement is contemplated, leaving the evident advantages which
attach to the appointive mode for securing the best selections, with
nothing to counterbalance them. 0
Yet, an "entirely new system" of choosing judges won out in Wisconsin-
the elective system.2z
The elective system was an experiment that would help define
Wisconsin's populist and progressive tradition. The elective system was
intended to minimize the bias of judges appointed by the legislature or
22governor. It was thought that judicial elections force judges to maintain a
sense of responsibility to the people.23 Supporters of the elective system
dismissed the concerns regarding judicial politicization and a loss of
independence.
[A] sufficient supreme court, chosen from the state at large, who
would necessarily have no party ends to subserve in any particular
district, who would have no political views or interests in common
subject to ten-year terms on a seven member court, and the Constitution has always provided for
judicial elections since Wisconsin became a state in 1848.
18. Constitutional Principles, supra note 1, at 34.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 35.
21. Journal and Debates of the Wisconsin State Constitutional Convention, Jan. 20, 1948,
reprinted in THE ATTAINMENT OF STATEHOOD, supra note 1, at 652.
22. Appointment by the legislature or governor were alternatives discussed by the judiciary
committee at the Constitutional Convention. See id. at 214.
23. Id. at 640.
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with any particular district or portion of the state, how certain, how
sure, would be the remedy to the great evil which so many see in the
future operation of the election system!
24
According to the Prairie Du Chien Patriot, the election of judges esteems
"a decided improvement upon the formation of the judiciary and an increased
confidence in the acts of the people. 25 Judicial election can certainly increase
accountability and public participation.
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSIVENESS AND THE ELECTORATE
Do justices, as they near re-election, decide cases on the basis of what
their constituents prefer? The answer remains unclear. Much literature
discusses the conflict between electoral accountability and judicial
independence.26 Early studies and past empirical research on the effects of
judicial selection processes consistently found that methods of judicial
recruitment did not affect judicial outcomes.27 Recent studies, however,
indicate that this conclusion is mistaken and that the motivations for strategic
behavior among members of the judiciary are more complex than previously
determined. 28 Thus, the issue of whether certain judicial selection methods
24. Id. at 642.
25. Virtues on the Constitution, PATRIOT (Prairie Du Chien, Wis.), June 22, 1847, reprinted in
THE ATrAINMENT OF STATEHOOD, supra note 1, at 114.
26. See, e.g., JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES (Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds.,
1993) (looking at whether interest groups play a key role in political struggles over judicial selection
procedures); SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 16 (focusing on how various judicial recruitment
processes influence the resolution of the judicial dilemma of balancing the conflicting demands of
objectivity in dispute resolution and accountability to the public in making policy); John H. Culver &
John T. Wold, Rose Bird and the Politics of Judicial Accountability in California, 70 JUDICATURE 81
(1986) (addressing, in case study by California Chief Justice Rose Bird, the conflict between judicial
independence and accountability as related to her upcoming election); William K. Hall & Larry T.
Aspin, What Twenty Years of Judicial Retention Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 338 (1987)
(finding, in a study of trial courts in ten states, that three in four voters tend to retain a judge);
Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr. & Charles H. Sheldon, Voters in Contested, Nonpartisan Judicial Elections:
A Responsible Electorate or a Problematic Public?, 36 W. POL. Q. 241 (1983) (questioning how to
enhance public knowledgeability in judicial elections and examining how knowledgeability can
create conditions that can balance judicial independence and democratic accountability).
27. See, e.g., Burton M. Atkins & Henry R. Glick, Formal Judicial Recruitment and State
Supreme Court Decisions, 2 AM. POL. Q. 427 (1974) (finding that selection methods do not affect
whether state supreme courts rule in favor of particular types of litigants).
28. See, e.g., DANIEL R. PINELLO, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL SELECTION METHOD ON STATE
SUPREME COURT POLICY 130 (1995) (concluding that the data show "that the conventional wisdom
of the 1980s among professional political scientists that selection method has no meaningful impact
on judicial policy is mistaken"); Melissa Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State
Supreme Courts, 54 J. POLITICS 427, 428 (1992) (arguing that "state supreme court justices act
strategically to minimize electoral opposition," and that "constituency influence in state supreme
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promote an independent judiciary remains unresolved.
Elections may undercut judicial independence, 29 and elected judges face a
majoritarian dilemma-whether they can both be accountable to the electing
majority and protective of minority interests.30 Judicial independence is the
ability to cast a judicial vote free from the opinions of the electorate, in a fair
and impartial manner according to facts and law. 3' Factors such as levels of
voter information, media coverage, and the fear of losing an election may
allow justices to vote freely and independently only until the period preceding
their election.32 However, previous literature and studies on this issue are far
from dispositive on this issue.
A. Responsiveness to the Electorate
Literature on legislative institutions lends strong support to the
proposition that the electoral process induces strategic behavior,33 suggesting
that judges decide cases to please voters. Research on the U.S. Congress
indicates that legislators vote with perceived constituent preferences on
visible issues.34 Studies indicate that the trend of public officials is to become
courts is enhanced by competitive electoral conditions and experience with electoral politics").
29. Compare John D. Fabian, Note, The Paradox of Elected Judges: Tensions in the American
Judicial System, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155, 155 (2001) (asserting that a system of elected judges
produces outcomes at odds with the goal of maintaining an independent judiciary that avoids the
appearance of impropriety), with Abrahamson, supra note 2, at 977 (favoring election of judges
because "the elective system can be an educational experience for both the judges and the electorate,"
and elections increase citizen understanding of the judiciary and actually promote judicial
independence).
30. Abrahamson, supra note 2, at 978 (observing that "[e]lected judges pose the majoritarian
dilemma: In a government committed to constitutionalism and the protection of rights, how can
judges accountable to the electorate, accountable to the majority, safeguard the minority?"). Though,
it must be stated that appointed federal judges face a counter-majoritarian dilemma. Id. at 979
(asking how, in a democracy, can non-elected federal judges justify overturning legislation adopted
by popularly elected officials representing the people's will).
31. See Abrahamson, Remarks Before the ABA Commission on Separation of Powers and
Judicial Independence, Washington D.C. (Dec. 13, 1996), reprinted in 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 69, 70 (1996).
32. Judges may not be free to do so in the periods directly preceding elections. See Julian N.
Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initiative and the Threat of Electoral Reprisal,
65 U. COLO. L. REv. 733, 738 (1994) (discussing survey results that found that a high percentage of
judges felt that "retention elections exert a major influence on their behavior"); see also Wainwright
v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 459 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("When... judges are elected, or when
they harbor political ambitions, such pressures are particularly dangerous.").
33. See infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Larry M. Bartels, Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making: The
Reagan Defense Buildup, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 457 (1991) (arguing that "[r]epresentatives' votes
on a series of defense budget roll calls in the first year of the Reagan administration's Pentagon
buildup are related to constituency opinions on defense spending during the 1980 election
campaign"); Robert S. Erickson, Constituency Opinion and Congressional Behavior: A
[87:323
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more consistent with their constituencies on policy matters as re-election
approaches.35
One wonders if a parallel can be drawn to state supreme court justices.
The tension between accountability and independence of elected judges can
be measured and defined by the decisions of individual justices and court
majorities. a6 Melissa Gann Hall argues that elected judges vote strategically
to minimize electoral opposition. 37 "[T]o appease their constituencies, [state
supreme court] justices who have views contrary to those of the voters and the
court majority, and who face competitive electoral conditions will vote with
the court majority instead of casting unpopular dissents on politically volatile
issues. 38 Daniel Pinello argues that elected judges react to public opinion,
while gubernatorial appointed judges are free of this constraint. 39 But, Pinello
lumps together non-partisan elections with partisan elections in his data.
Thus, voting patterns, and his results, may be affected by partisan politics.
However, strategic voting by judges may be unlikely considering evidence
Reexamination of the Miller-Stokes Representation Data, 22 AM. J. POL. SCI., 511 (1978)
(suggesting earlier research underestimated the correlation between constituency opinion and
congressional behavior); Warren E. Miller & Donald Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress, 57
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 45 (1963) (arguing that local constituencies have a measure of control over their
representatives).
35. See, e.g., Richard Eiling, Ideological Change in the U.S. Senate: Time and Electoral
Responsiveness, 7 LEGIS. STUDIES Q. 75 (1982) (examining whether a "senator's ideological stance
changes as a function of time remaining in his term," and finding that "[p]attemed instability did
exist and such shifting was generally in the direction of ideological moderation"); James H.
Kuklinski, Representatives and Elections: A Policy Analysis, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 165 (1978)
(finding that representatives are more responsive to direct public opinion of the final year of a term);
Martin Thomas, Election Proximity and Senatorial Role Call Voting, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI 96 (1985)
(finding that the "voting behavior of U.S. Senators reveals that many reelection-seeking U.S.
Senators deliberately change the ideological tenor of their roll-call voting during the course of their
terms," with a shift ideologically in the direction of their likely opponent); Gerald C. Wright, Jr. &
Michael B. Berkman, Candidates and Policies in the United States Senate Elections, 80 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 567 (1986) (analyzing 1992 U.S. Senate elections, and demonstrating that "candidates
behave as though they believe issues are important to voters... and candidates' issue positions and
voters' evaluations of the president and the economy interact to provide clear patterns of policy
effects on Senate election outcomes").
36. See, e.g., Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay Preferences, Case Facts,
Context, and Structure in the Politics of Judicial Choice, 59 J. POLITICS 1206 (1997) (examining
individual votes cast in death penalty decisions by supreme court justices in eight American states
from 1983 to 1988); Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Studying Courts Comparatively: The View
from the American States, 48 POL. RESEARCH Q. 5 (1995) (estimating several models of state
supreme court justices' voting on the death penalty); Hall, supra note 28, at 427 (studying the
individual justice votes in death penalty cases in four southern state supreme courts).
37. Hall, supra note 28, at 428.
38. Id.
39. PINELLO, supra note 28, at 99 (stating that at least judges who do not face a confirmation
vote are free from this constraint).
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of low levels of voter information about the judiciary.4° Studies, however,
have documented that judicial elections do reflect informed judgments by the
electorate.41 The idea of strategic voting may also be undermined because of
the non-competitive nature of elections. Studies have documented patterns of
incumbent success, low levels of voter information, and poor turnout rates in
judicial elections.42 Other studies have reached the opposite conclusion. In
contrast, judicial elections also have been found to be quite competitive, and
low-level participation is not a permeating characteristic of many elections.43
Regardless of the level of security in a position, public officials in an electoral
setting often fear the voters.44 The opinions of the electorate may, in fact,
impact judicial voting. However, low levels of voter information may allow
justices to vote freely until the period preceding their election. Thus, judicial
independence may be affected by proximity to election. The literature is far
from conclusive on the issue.
B. Public Opinion on Crime
Criminal cases were chosen for this analysis of justices' responsiveness to
40. See Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Media, Knowledge, and Public Evaluations of
the Supreme Court 352, 373, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS (Lee Epstein, ed., 1995) (finding that
citizens are generally unaware of Supreme Court decisions); see also John N. Kessel, Public
Perceptions of the Supreme Court, 10 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 167, 172-75 (1966) (revealing the
public's lack of understanding about what the court does); Joseph D. Kearney & Howard B.
Eisenberg, The Print Media and Judicial Elections: Some Case Studies from Wisconsin, 85 MARQ. L.
REv. 593, 775 (2002) (suggesting that "while a fair amount of information about judicial candidates
is made available to voters, that information still seems to lack the educative component needed to
overcome the general public ignorance that we have little doubt exists concerning judicial
officeholders and judicial elections").
41. See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Explaining the Vote in Judicial Elections: The 1984 Ohio
Supreme Court Elections, 40 W. POL. Q. 361, 369 (1987) (suggesting that levels of voter information
in judicial races "can be sufficiently high to allow meaningful judgments about the candidates");
Lovrich & Sheldon, supra note 26, at 246 (finding it encouraging that between 20-40% of survey
respondents felt they had enough information to vote for candidates in judicial re-elections).
42. See, e.g., Kenyon N. Griffin & Michael J. Horan, Merit Retention Elections: What
Influences the Voters?, 63 JUDICATURE 78. 80 (1983) (noting that "[a] prominent characteristic of the
1978 judicial retention elections was the rate of voter abstention or non-participation"); Hall &
Aspin, supra note 26, at 347 (finding that judicial retention elections are generally characterized by
low voter turnout).
43. See PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST
FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1980) (noting that low levels of citizen participation in judicial elections are
uncharacteristic in the United States).
44. See JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS 62 (2d ed. 1981) (stating
that politicians balance the cost of voting against the probability of losing and "opt to vote in an
electorally safe way, even though he reasons that the loss of a significant number of votes in the next
election really is not at issue"); THOMAS MANN, UNSAFE AT ANY MARGIN: INTERPRETING
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 3 (1978) (stating that legislators feel "a pervasive sense of electoral
insecurity").
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constituents because the public is very interested in crime and criminal
sentencing,45 and levels of voter information in judicial races are high enough
to allow for informed judgments about judicial candidates. 6 In 1993, 79% of
Americans favored or strongly favored more severe sentences for all crimes. 7
Criminal cases, especially those with a high profile, can instill strong public
opinion. From 1980 to 1994, between 79% to 86% of the U.S. citizens felt
that courts in their area did not deal harshly enough with criminals.48 These
strong attitudes about crime can be reflected in attitudes toward the court
system. For example, in 1994, Americans blamed the courts and the prison
system more than any other institution for the increase in crime in the United
States.49
In metropolitan Milwaukee, which accounts for nearly 40% of
Wisconsin's total population, citizens have strong opinions and attitudes on
criminals and sentencing as well. 50  The majority of residents in the
Milwaukee metropolitan area perceive that crime is on the rise across the
nation as a whole and within their city.5' A majority, in dealing with violent
criminals, prefers its tax money to go to prisons and punishment.52 Seventy
percent support longer prison sentences to prevent crime, and a majority
supports the death penalty.53
IV. HYPOTHESES
Although judges may vote with actual or conceived voter preferences
towards "being tough on crime," the central concern of an elected judge is
probably that a case vote will be used against him or her in an upcoming
45. See SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 16, at 51 (showing that 67% of Washington state
candidates thought the public was interested in their attitudes on sentencing); BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-
1994, 141 tbl.2.2 (1995) (showing that, in 1994, 26-36% of U.S. citizens felt that crime was the most
important issue for the government to address).
46. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
47. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 45, at 172 tbl.2.39.
48. Id. at 174-75 tbl.2.43.
49. Id. at 157 tbl.2.22 (showing that 33% of Americans blamed the courts and prisons for the
increase in crime as opposed to home and schools (27%), pop culture and the media (14%),
government (12%), and law enforcement (8%)).
50. See, e.g., Public Perception, Public Safety: Reality and Opinion about Crime in Milwaukee,
Public Policy Forum, Milwaukee, WI (May 1999), available at
http://www.publicpolicyforum.org/josh/pubpercpubsaf.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2002).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. Although a majority supports the death penalty, it should be noted that Wisconsin does
not have the death penalty.
2003]
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election.54 Absent a candidate or activist making an issue of the vote, few
people may ever find out about it. The judicial worry is not that the judge will
violate public opinion, but more precisely, that someone will draw attention to
that violation during an election.
55
Certainly, political issues and judicial voting records become more
publicized closer to election. This strongly suggests that researchers would be
wise to look at voting patterns near an election because proximity to an
upcoming election may promote responsiveness to constituents and promote
voting with a court's majority. Similarly, the time elapsed since the last
election may also affect the level of responsiveness.56
However, strategic voting due to electoral politics may be unrealistic if, in
fact, judges experience high levels of incumbent success or any individual
judge does not face opposition. There is no reason to fear being removed
from office by voters if one never faces strong opposition. If, however, a
judge frequently faces strong opponents, resulting in narrow election margins,
that judge may be induced to vote strategically. Thus, narrow election
margins may promote responsiveness to constituents and voting with a court's
majority.
Similarly, electoral experience may make judges more aware of voter
preferences and may make judges think more carefully about their
constituents when making judicial voting choices. Judges with election
experience may have already sought out constituent preferences and public
opinion while on the campaign trail. They have also already faced the
possibility of losing a race for a judicial position. Hence, the experience of
being elected may promote responsiveness to constituents.
The hypothesized form of responsiveness is that an individual justice is
less likely to vote for a criminal defendant and more likely to vote in the
majority as the justice gets closer to election or has just won a tightly
contested election. A judge who is not acting independently would be more
likely to vote for the prosecution, as public opinion studies indicate that
constituents prefer harsher penalties and convictions for criminal defendants.
The literature on judicial decision-making and legislative voting suggests
the following hypotheses about the voting behavior of the elected Wisconsin
State Supreme Court:
54. See Abrahamson, supra note 2, at 986 (stating that the Chief Justice's sole dissent in a
sexual predator case was used against her in the 1999 election campaign and that the advertisement
implied that the Chief Justice's presence on the court would allow sexual predators to prey on
children).
55. See Franklin & Kosaki, supra note 40, at 373 (noting that the public is much more likely to
be aware of a decision when the media devotes more media coverage to a case).
56. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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HI: The proximity to an upcoming election promotes responsiveness to
constituents.
H2: The time elapsed since the previous election and closeness of that
election's vote margin promotes responsiveness to constituents.
H3: The experience of being elected, as opposed to appointed, in the
initial term promotes responsiveness to constituents.
H4: The proximity to upcoming election promotes voting with a majority
of the court.
H5: Narrow election margins promote responsiveness to constituents.
H6: Narrow election margins promote voting with the majority.
V. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Wisconsin Supreme Court Characteristics
The Wisconsin Supreme Court is composed of seven justices 57 and sits
atop the Wisconsin court system, which also contains four court of appeals
districts (with sixteen judges) and lower circuit courts located throughout the
state.58 The Wisconsin Supreme Court controls its own docket, receiving
1000 petitions for review each year and accepting around 100-120 cases to
hear each year.59
Since 1996, Shirley Abrahamson has been the Chief Justice of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court. The Chief Justice was appointed to the court in
1976 by Democrat Governor Pat Lucey. Of the seven justices on the 2002-03
court, three were appointed by Republican Governor Tommy G. Thompson:
Justices Jon Wilcox, David Prosser, Jr., and Diane S. Sykes. Both Justices
Wilcox and Prosser were former Republican State Assemblymen, with
Prosser serving as Speaker of the Assembly from 1995-96. Justices William
A. Bablitch, Ann Walsh Bradley, and N. Patrick Crooks were elected to their
first terms on the court. Justice Crooks is a former circuit judge and Justice
Bablitch a former Democrat State Senator. Pat Roggensack was elected in
April 2003 to replace the retiring Justice Bablitch.
The justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court are elected to ten-year terms
57. For a history of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and its Justices, see Portraits of Justice:
Wisconsin Supreme Court 1848-1998 (Trina E. Haag, ed., 2d ed. 2002), available at
http://www.wicourts.gov/supreme/pdf/Portraits2ndEd.pdf.
58. See Court System Overview, http://www.wicourts.gov/global/Overview.html (last visited
May 1, 2003). For more information on the Wisconsin Court system, see
http://www.courts.state.wi.us.
59. See Wisconsin Supreme Court, How a Case Moves Through the Courts,
http://www.wicourts.gov/global/How a Case.htm (last modified Aug. 20, 2002). It takes three
justices to grant a petition for review. Id.
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in statewide, non-partisan April elections.60  Vacancies are filled by
gubernatorial appointment, 6I and the appointee is expected to stand for
election to a full ten-year term the following spring.62 Because the Wisconsin
Constitution limits the justices to running one at a time, an appointee who
joins the court near the end of another justice's term will be required to wait
for an open spring election in which to run.63 For example, Justice Wilcox
was appointed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1992 to replace Justice
William Callow. However, because of intervening judicial elections, Wilcox
was not elected to a full term until 1997.
Wisconsin Supreme Court justices rarely run for election unopposed,
regardless of whether they were first elected or appointed to the court. In only
five of the seventeen supreme court elections prior to 2000 were justices
unopposed. In the last twenty years, the closest margin of victory in an
election was that of Justice Steinmetz in 1980 with just over 50% of the vote;
the largest margin of victory occurred when Justice Geske garnered 77% of
the vote in 1994. Incumbent justices are usually successful, and justices are
rarely removed from office. In fact, the last incumbent justice who lost an
election, and the only Chief Justice to be unsuccessful in an election bid, was
Chief Justice George R. Currie, who was defeated by Robert W. Hansen in
1967.64 Justices can also be removed by impeachment,6 5 but only Justice Levi
Hubbell, in 1853, has faced an impeachment trial, and he was acquitted.66
Although Wisconsin Supreme Court elections can be hotly contested,
these elections receive relatively low voter turnout. For example, in
November 1999, over 1.7 million Wisconsinites voted in the United States
Senate general election, while only 758,965 citizens voted in the April 1999
Wisconsin Supreme Court general election. This low voter turnout is a
product of the constitutional rule that judicial elections cannot be on the same
ballot as partisan general elections for state or county officers, nor within
thirty days before or after such an election.67 As a result, the supreme court
60. WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 4, cl. 1.
61. The governor appoints justices for vacancies resulting for any reason, including retirement,
death, resignation, or appointment to the federal bench. The governor has complete discretion in
picking the replacement justice. There is no judicial committee which compiles a candidate list as in
Missouri, and legislative confirmation is not required.
62. WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 9.
63. See, e.g., Kearney & Eisenberg, supra note 40, at 601 & n.29.
64. See Robert W. Hansen, http://www.wicourts.gov/supreme/biohistory/whansen.htm (last
visited May 1, 2003).
65. WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
66. See Levi Hubbell, http://www.wicourts.gov/supreme/biohistory/hubbell.htm (last visited
May 1, 2003).
67. WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 9.
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election is frequently the only race on the spring ballot or is accompanied by
only local races.
B. The Sample of Wisconsin Supreme Court Cases
The data set used to test the hypotheses consists of the 417 criminal case
opinions filed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the fifteen year period
including the 1986-87 through 2000-01 terms.6 8 The data set was created
using a LEXIS search of "WI Criminal Cases" in the "Supreme Court of
Wisconsin (= COURT)," and it includes cases involving an individual
criminal defendant or prisoner.69 All attorney or judicial disciplinary cases,
medical malpractice cases, mental commitment proceedings, insurance cases,
civil suits and "child in need of protection or services" cases were deleted
from the over-inclusive data set provided by LEXIS. These cases were
deleted because they are not traditional criminal cases involving a criminal
defendant or a convicted prisoner. Public opinion data on these traditional
criminal cases indicate strong citizen preferences.7 ° Individual justice voting
(or non-participation) and the majority voting result were recorded in each
case by reading the cases as recorded by Westlaw. 7' These fifteen years
include the votes of thirteen justices.72 Information regarding the justices'
years of service and all election results were retrieved from the State of
Wisconsin Blue Books.73
C. Individual Justice Characteristics
The voting tendencies of the justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
during the analyzed terms are summarized in Table 1. As the table indicates,
two justices are characterized as "non-conformist," voting for the defendant's
claims a majority of the time, and three justices are characterized as
"moderate," voting for the defendant's claims over 40% of the time. Eight
justices are characterized as "conformist" because they have a tendency to
vote against defendants, which conforms to public opinion. This information
68. Here, the fifteen most recent full supreme court terms were analyzed. Ideally, this analysis
could include more supreme court terms, and possibly all types of cases in the fifteen year period that
could be analyzed by category.
69. LEXIS was used for the initial search because it has a separate criminal cases database.
70. See supra Part IlI.B.
71. Westlaw was used because its search engine also provides information on whether a justice
has not participated in a decision.
72. The thirteen justices who cast votes in this fifteen year period include: Shirley Abrahamson,
William Bablitch, Ann Walsh Bradley, William Callow, Louis Ceci, N. Patrick Crooks, Roland Day,
Janine Geske, Nathan Heffernan, David Prosser, Donald Steinmetz, Diane Sykes, and Jon Wilcox.




is relevant, as "conformist" justices may not have personal preferences that
conflict with the preferences of their constituents. 74  The two "non-
conformist" justices, however, may be in conflict with the preferences of their
constituency in criminal cases. Justices who vote in favor of the defendant in
criminal cases may be acting in contrast to the preferences of the electors.
This may produce voters who are dissatisfied with justices' performances on
the court. As a consequence, a justice may have an opponent in his or her re-
election bid, possibly resulting in removal from office.
TABLE I
VOTING TENDENCIES OF THE JUSTICES OF THE WISCONSIN SUPREME
COURT: PERCENTAGE OF VOTES IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS' CLAIMS IN
CRIMINAL CASES
1986-87 TO 2000-01 TERMS
'Non- Total % for 'Moderate' Total % for 'Conformist' Total % for
Conformist' Votes A Justices Votes A Justices Votes A
Justices
A. Walsh 189 56.1% J. Geske 133 45.9% D. Sykes 61 31.1%
Bradley
S. 415 54.7% N. 228 43.0% N. P. Crooks 160 26.3%
Abrahamson Heffernan
W. Bablitch 414 40.8% J. Wilcox 256 26.2%
D. Steinmetz 355 26.1%
D. Prosser 96 24.0%
W. Callow 158 22.8%
I R. Day 257 22.6%
L. Ceci 181 17.7%
D. Methodology and Coding
Table 2 offers a description of the manner in which variables were coded
for this analysis. A term has been defined as a ten-year elected term or the
first appointed term. This analysis considers only votes and does not consider
those cases in which a justice does not participate.
74. The findings, as described in Part VI, could benefit from the addition of an independent
variable of political ideology or policy preference to the regression analysis.
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VOTE = 0 If vote was cast in favor of Defendant's claim
= I If vote was cast against the Defendant's claim
= Missing If justice did not participate in the court's decision
MAJVOTE = 0 If vote, do not vote with the majority
= 1 If vote with the majority
= Missing No court majority
= Missing If justice did not participate in the court's decision
APPTTERM = 0 Otherwise
= I If vote was cast by justice in initial appointed term
FIRSTTERM - 0 Otherwise
- I If vote was cast by justice serving in first term
YRSELECT Number of years until next election at time of decision
FIRSTONE - 0 Otherwise
SI If vote was cast in the first year of a term
FIRSTTWO 0 Otherwise
= I If vote was cast in the first two years of a term
MARGIN = Percentage of the vote won in the preceding election by justice casting the
vote (Unopposed = 100%).
Missing If appointed to the term in which the justice is casting the judicial
vote
In testing the hypotheses on strategic behavior by the overall court, the
preferred unit of analysis clearly is the vote. Because the dependent variable
is dichotomous-when a dissenting vote from a majority decision against a
defendant's claim is coded as 0, and a vote with the majority is coded as 1-
binary logistic regression was chosen for this analysis.7 5  In order to account
for the relationship between the votes of individual justices, all regression
analyses control for individual justices in order to account for the fact that
75. Intercooled STATA 7.0 was used to perform the binary logistic regression analyses. For
further information on coding and regression of dichotomous and dummy variables, see MELISSA A.
HARDY, REGRESSION WITH DUMMY VARIABLES (1993). The regression coefficient in a binary
logistic regression represents the independent variable's incremental change to the logarithm of the
odds of voting. "By taking the antilog of the logistic coefficient" (e), one can complete an
"arithmetic translation of the additive effects to multiplicative effects in which the dependant variable
is a simple odds ratio." Id. at 76.
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individual votes may not be independently cast.
TABLE 3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES USED IN THE ANALYSIS
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev.
VOTE 2903 .645 .478
MAJVOTE 2879 .878 .327
APPTTERM 2919 .087 .282
FIRSTTERM 2919 .316 .465
FIRSTONE 2919 .153 .360
FIRSTTWO 2919 .269 .444
MARGIN 2657 74.64 20.98
YRSELECT 2919 4.64 2.93
In testing the hypotheses on strategic voting closer to re-election by
individual court members and certain factions of the court, 76 z-Tests for two
samples were used. The z-Test is used to determine the significance of
differences between two independent samples-in this study, voting in the
initial years of a term versus voting in the last two years of a term. Thus, the
two sample z-Tests are used to compare a justice's (or faction's) voting
percentage for a defendant's claim in the two years prior to re-election versus
the percentage in the early years of an individual justice's (or the individual
justices') terms. One can then determine the actual significance of percentage
differences between the two voting sets (in other words, is the difference
between the percentages real or just due to chance variation?). The two-
sample z-statistic, which can be used for percentages, is computed from the
sizes, averages, and standard deviations of the two samples.77 The applicable
z-Tests can be found in Appendices A and B and are summarized in Tables 10
and 11.
VI. FINDINGS
A. Analyzing the Court's Overall Voting Patterns
Being appointed (versus elected) in the initial term has a large and
76. See infra Parts VI.B & C.
77. DAVID FREEDMAN, ET AL., STATISTICS 507 (3d ed. 1998).
[87:323
VOTING AND ELECTORAL POLITICS
statistically significant effect on judicial voting for a defendant's claim in the
first year. Large electoral margins of victory have a very small effect on the
hypothesized direction of increasing the likelihood of voting for a criminal
defendant and no statistically significant effect on the likelihood to vote with
the court's majority. Much of the hypothesized form of responsiveness,
however, is unsupported by the data. The data do not suggest that individual
justices will be less likely to vote for a criminal defendant and more likely to
vote in the majority as the justice gets closei to election or has just won a
tightly contested election. The time elapsed since election also has no
significant impact on judicial voting for a defendant's legal claim.
1. Appointment Versus Election in the First Term
Hypothesis Three states that the experience of being elected (as opposed
to appointed) in the initial term promotes responsiveness to constituents.78
The data show, in Table 4, a statistically significant (and quite interesting)
relationship between voting and being appointed in the first term. The data
reveal regression coefficients (3) of -0.695 and 0.472 respectively when the
vote was regressed on whether the vote was cast in an appointed term (which
is always a first term) or in a first term.
TABLE 4







Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: Regression controls for individual justices.
7 9
Thus, this logistic regression looks at voting patterns in the first terms by
78. In order to test Hypothesis Three, VOTE was regressed on FIRSTTERM and APPTTERM.
79. All regression analyses in this study control for the fact that every vote is not independent
and is fixed by justice. Thus, because judges have individual biases and worldviews (as Tables 10
and 11 may indicate), failure to do so would result in analyzing observations that are not independent
(possibly making the standard errors too small and the significance exaggerated) or potentially
biasing the sample.
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justices who have been elected versus those that have been appointed. The
data indicate that justices appointed in the first term are 50.0 1% (eP = 0.499)
more likely to votefor a defendant's claim in the first term versus other terms.
However, those justices elected to their first term are 60.3% (e = 1.603) more
likely to vote against a defendant's claim versus other terms. This suggests
that Hypothesis Three is correct: The experience of being appointed versus
elected in the initial term promotes responsiveness to constituents and affects
how a justice votes in his or her initial term on the court.
2. Election Margins and Voting
Hypothesis Five states that election vote margins promote responsiveness
to constituents. 80 The data in Table 5 show an extremely small relationship
between voting and election margin (3 = -0.008), which is significant to only
10%. The result is practically insignificant because there is only a very slight
change in the odds (0.8%), but the results are essentially confirmed by the
other data analyses.8 ' By including MARGIN in the testing for Hypothesis
One (see Table 6), which shows a statistically significant relationship to 10%
as well, the results of Hypotheses Five are confirmed. The data also shows
that MARGIN is unrelated to other variables, but is related to how justices
vote, as seen in the data from Hypotheses One and Two in which the
coefficients, when VOTE is regressed on MARGIN and another variable, are
of equal value.
TABLE 5





Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1%
Note: Regression controls for individual justices.
80. In order to test Hypothesis Five, VOTE was regressed on MARGIN.
8 1. See infra tbls.6 & 7.
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The observed relationship indicates that large vote margins may promote
responsiveness to constituents, as measured by increased likelihood to vote
for a criminal defendant,82 though only in a very small amount of statistical
significance. The 0.08% increase in likelihood to vote for a defendant's claim
for every one percentage point earned in an election victory is only significant
to 10% (p < 0.1). Thus, in this observed significance level, there is a 10% 8 3
chance of getting a test statistic as extreme as or more extreme than the
observed one. Convention in the social sciences, however, states that
differences are statistically significant when p < .05. It had been hypothesized
that large margins of victory could allow for more judicial independence in
voting for, rather than against, a defendant's claim.
3. Hypotheses Unsupported by the Regression Data
Hypothesis One states that proximity to upcoming election promotes
responsiveness to constituents.84 The data show an insignificant relationship
between voting and the number of years until the next election. This does
suggest that Hypothesis One may be incorrect. However, this finding is not
conclusive when compared to results that show changes in voting as election
nears as a function of previous voting preferences.85
Hypothesis Two states that the time elapsed since a previous election and
the closeness of that election's vote margin promotes responsiveness to
constituents.86 The data show an insignificant relationship between voting
and being in the first two years of a term. This suggests that Hypothesis Two
is incorrect. A short time elapsed since the previous election with a small
margin of victory does not promote responsiveness to constituents.
82. This may indicate increased judicial independence with larger victories. See supra Part
VI.A.
83. Actually 8.7% as p = 0.087:< 0.1.
84. In order to test Hypothesis One, VOTE was regressed on YRSELECT, MARGIN, and
MAJVOTE.
85. See infra tbl. 11.
86. In order to test Hypothesis Two, VOTE was regressed on MARGIN, MAJVOTE,
FIRSTONE, and FIRSTFWO.
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TABLE 6
RESULTS OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION FOR HYPOTHESIS #1
(1) (2) (1) (2)
VOTE VOTE e eD
YRSELECT 0.003 0.005 1.003 1.005
(0.017) (0.018)





Standard errors in parentheses
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: Regression controls for individual justices.
TABLE 7
RESULTS OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION FOR HYPOTHESIS #2
(1) (2) (1) (2)
VOTE VOTE eP 0
FIRSTONE 0.005 1.005
(0.141)
MARGIN -0.008 -0.008 0.992 0.992
(0.005) (0.005)





Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: Regression controls for individual justices.
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Hypothesis Four states that proximity to upcoming elections promotes
voting with a majority of the court.8 7  The data show an insignificant
relationship between voting and the number of years until the next election.
This suggests that Hypothesis Four is incorrect. Proximity to an upcoming
election does not influence a justice's tendency to vote with a majority of the
court.
TABLE 8





Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: Regression controls for individual justices.
Hypothesis Six states that narrow election vote margins promote voting
with the majority of the court.88 The data show an insignificant relationship
between election margins and voting with the majority. This suggests that
Hypothesis Six is incorrect. Large margins of victory in elections do not
promote voting with the court's majority.
TABLE 9





Standard errors in parentheses
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: Regression controls for individual justices.
87. In order to test Hypothesis Four, MAJVOTE was regressed on YRSELECT.
88. In order to test Hypothesis Six, MAJVOTE was regressed on MARGIN.
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B. Voting Patterns of Individual Justices
In testing whether individual members of the court change their voting
patterns as each justice nears re-election, the number of votes against a
defendant in the last two years of a term (i.e., two years preceding re-election)
were compared to votes from all other years of a term (i.e., initial years of a
term) (See Table 10). All cases from the data set in which an individual
justice cast a vote were included in this analysis. Justices Bablitch, Callow,
Ceci, Day, Geske, Heffernan, and Prosser showed no statistically significant
change (p > :0.05) in their voting in criminal cases. Justices Bradley, Crooks,
and Sykes were not considered in this analysis because they have yet to
experience voting in the last two years of a term.
TABLE 10
COMPARISON OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE VOTING IN INITIAL YEARS OF
TERM VERSUS LAST Two YEARS OF TERM89
(Summary of Appendix A)
Initial Years of Last Two Years of %
Justice Term Term Difference z-test
% Vote Against % Vote Against
Defendant Defendant p-Value (one-tail)
Abrahamson 38.83 60.48 21.65 1.89E-05*
Bablitch 59.68 54.76 -4.92 0.274
Callow 76.34 81.48 5.14 0.303
Ceci 82.91 78.26 -4.65 0.308
Day 79.21 70.91 -8.30 0.112
Geske 53.49 55.32 1.83 0.420
Heffernan 59.34 47.83 -11.51 0.083
Prosser 75.68 76.27 0.59 0.473
Steinmetz 71.54 81.05 9.51 0.027*
Wilcox 1 76.92 63.93 -12.99 0.028*
*statistically significant (p < .05)
Justices Sykes, Bradley, and Crooks have not yet been in the last two years of a
term.
89. The methodology treats years before retirement the same as years before re-election. This
choice does not affect the substantive findings. When the data were analyzed, deleting all justices
who face only retirement, and not election, during the years included in the study, no changes of
magnitude or statistical significance in the findings resulted.
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The data show that Justices Abrahamson, Steinmetz, and Wilcox have
statistically significant (p < .05) changes in their voting for or against a
defendant's claim. Uniquely, Justice Wilcox voted against a defendant's
claim in 12.99% less of his votes in the two years preceding election
compared to the other votes in the initial years of his term. On the other hand,
Justices Abrahamson and Steinmetz are more likely to vote against a
defendant's claim as they near re-election (defined by looking at the votes in
.those two years preceding re-election). In the last two years of his terms,
Justice Steinmetz voted against a defendant's claim in 9.5 1% more cases (p <
0.05). At 21.65% (p < 0.05), Justice Abrahamson showed a substantial
increase in her voting against a defendant's claim in the last two years of her
terms.
C. Group Voting Patterns
In testing whether the certain factions of the court (see Table 1) change
their voting patterns as the justices in these groups near election or re-election,
the percentage of votes against a defendant in the last two years of all terms
(i.e. two years preceding re-election) were compared with the percentage from
all other years of all terms (i.e. initial years of a term) (See Table 11). All
cases from the data set in which an individual justice cast a vote were
included in this analysis.
TABLE 1 1
COMPARISON OF GROUP VOTING IN INITIAL YEARS OF TERM VERSUS
LAST Two YEARS OF TERM
(Summary of Appendix B)
Initial Years of Last Two Years of
Faction Term Term % Difference z-test
% Vote Against % Vote Against p-Value
Defendant Defendant (one-tail)
Conformist 77.22 72.44 -4.78 0.0727
Non-
Conformist/Moderate 54.93 62.99 8.06 0.00269
p-value = statistically significant when p < .05
The data indicate that the "conformist" grouping, comprised of Justices
Callow, Ceci, Crooks, Day, Prosser, Sykes, Steinmetz, and Wilcox, did not
have a statistically significant change in voting against a defendant as the
individual members of the group neared election or re-election. However, the
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change of 4.78% fewer cases in which voting against a defendant is
significant to only 10% (p < 0.1).
The "non-conformist/moderate" group consists of Chief Justice
Abrahamson, and Justices Bablitch, Bradley, Geske, and Heffernan. The data
show that the "non-conformist/moderate" grouping voted against a
defendant's claim in 8.06% more cases in the two years preceding election or
re-election of the individual justices that comprise the group. This change is
statistically significant (p < .01).
VII. EVALUATION OF FINDINGS
A. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's Overall Use of Strategic Voting
Hypothesis Three has been confirmed by the data. The experience of
being elected (as opposed to appointed) promotes responsiveness to
constituents. 90 Much of the hypothesized form of responsiveness, however, is
unsupported by the data. Proximity to upcoming elections and time elapsed
since the previous election does not promote responsiveness to constituents. 91
The data suggest that justices who are appointed to the court are
significantly more likely to vote for a defendant's claim in their first term
versus all other terms. In fact, those appointed are 50% more likely to do so
than they would be in later terms, or if they had been elected to their first
term. On the other hand, those justices elected in the first term are over 60%
more likely to vote against a defendant's claim in the first term.
This finding suggests that there are serious ramifications to judicial
selection methods. It may indicate that justices who have been elected exhibit
a strong sense of responsibility to the electorate, especially in the initial term,
and that voters generally prefer to elect justices who vote against defendant's
claims.92 Meanwhile, appointed judges may feel free to exert more judicial
independence in voting, supporting Pinello's conclusion that elected judges
react to public opinion while gubernatorial appointed judges are free of this
constraint.93 Appointed judges may be more protective of unpopular interests,
like those of criminal defendants, and less accountable to an electorate that
prefers judges who are "tough on crime. 94 The data are quite strong in this
finding of differences in voting patterns among justices appointed versus
90. See supra Part VI.A. 1.
91. See supratbls.6, 7 & 8.
92. The variable MAJVOTE is highly correlated with VOTE in a positive direction. This
means that the court generally votes against a defendant's claim.
93. See PINELLO, supra note 28, at 99; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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elected in the first term, and future research should look at judges that have
experienced both appointment and election, possibly looking to other states
that elect their judiciary, yet fill vacancies via appointment. This study
supports recent literature and empirical studies that conclude that elected
judiciaries participate in strategic voting.95
The confirmation of Hypothesis Three, that the election experience
promotes responsiveness to the electorate, is quite revealing, considering that
the regression data show that proximity to an upcoming election, time elapsed
since previous elections, and the closeness of election margins (i.e.,
Hypotheses One, Two, and Four) do not promote responsiveness to
constituents or voting with the court's majority. These conclusions support
earlier research on strategic voting, which suggests that elections do not
compromise independence. But, proximity to upcoming election may
promote responsiveness by forcing justices to "moderate" their voting
patterns.96 The differential in "appointed" versus "elected" judicial votes in
the first term may also suggest that being elected at all, regardless of other
factors, is a major factor in determining voting patterns in any given term.
B. Individual Justices' Use of Strategic Voting
In testing whether an individual member of the court changes his or her
voting patterns as he or she nears re-election, the number of votes against a
defendant in the last two years of a term (i.e., two years preceding re-election)
were compared against votes from all other years of a term (i.e., initial years
of a term) (see Table 10). Having concluded that the overall proximity of the
justices to election has no significant impact on judicial voting for a
defendant's legal claim, some individual justices do seem to display changes
in voting patterns as they near re-election. Thus, some justices do display the
characteristics of Hypothesis One as the data show that proximity to
upcoming election for these justices may promote responsiveness to
constituents.
Justices Abrahamson, Wilcox, and Steinmetz all display statistically
significant changes in voting patterns in the last two years of terms compared
to the votes made in initial years of a term. One could explain that this is
because of the close election races of these three justices. All three were
elected in a total of six races in which the largest vote percentage received by
any one justice was 65%. 97 Even Abrahamson herself notes that each of her
95. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
96. See infra Part VII.C.
97. Abrahamson has percentage points of 65%, 55%, 64%, Wilcox 62%, and Steinmetz 52%
and 50%.
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elections were "hotly contested." 98 However, the results of Table 6 indicate
that election margins may not be a factor, even for these justices, as the
regression analysis controls for these individual election contests, and there
are many tight races among the other justices in the study.
It would be speculative to suggest what factors would contribute to these
significant changes among these three justices.99 More analysis on each of the
individual justices is needed as, for example, Chief Justice Abrahamson, who
frequently votes for defendant's claims (See Table 1), is often the lone
dissenter,'00 and she has continued in this manner despite the political nature
of the office. 10 Thus, one should not be surprised that Justice Abrahamson
stated, "My own experience, not surprisingly, supports my views about
judicial independence of elected judges."10 2
Interestingly, Abrahamson favors an elective system because she thinks it
will promote independence, 0 3 yet she says this very independence grows out
of judges meeting with current and future lawyers and litigants during the
political process. 10 4  But, being aware of the threat of compromising
independence, could a justice subconsciously be affected by the desires of the
electorate? Being affected by the desires of the electorate, even
subconsciously, may be inappropriate. 105 On the other hand, should we not
expect (or even want) judges to be influenced by the electorate? 10 6
98. Abrahamson, supra note 2, at 975.
99. However, seeking to moderate their voting patterns in the face of election may be a
possibility. See supra Part VII.C.
100. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 539 N.W.2d 887 (Wis. 1995); State v. Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d
105 (Wis. 1995); State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115 (Wis. 1995); State v. Davids, 534 N.W.2d 70 (Wis.
1995); State v. Messelt, 518 N.W.2d 232 (Wis. 1994); State v. West 517 N.W.2d 482 (Wis. 1994);
State v. Walkowiak, 515 N.W.2d 863 (Wis. 1994); State v. Koch, 499 N.W.2d 152 (Wis. 1993);
State v. Anderson, 477 N.W.2d 277 (Wis. 1991) (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting, joined by Abrahamson,
J.); State v. Weber, 476 N.W.2d 867 (Wis. 1991); State v. Weber, 471 N.W.2d 187 (Wis. 1991);
State v. Whitrock, 468 N.W.2d 696 (Wis. 1991); State v. Lindh, 468 N.W.2d 168 (Wis. 1991); State
v. Noll, 467 N.W.2d 116 (Wis. 1991); State v. Murdock, 455 N.W.2d 618 (Wis. 1990); State v.
DeSmidt, 454 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 1990); State v. Seifert, 454 N.W.2d 346 (Wis. 1990); State v.
Hanson, 401 N.W.2d 771 (Wis. 1987).
101. Chief Justice Abrahamson has noted this herself, as she was the target of political
television advertisements involving criminal cases. See Abrahamson, supra note 2, at 975 (noting
that her vote in a Terry stop case was the target of television ads).
102. Abrahamson, supra note 2, at 975 (pointing to State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115 (Wis. 1995),
and State v. Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. 1995), where, in both, Abrahamson wrote the sole
dissent and which are both included in the data set of this paper).
103. Id. at 977.
104. Id.
105. Id. at984.
106. See Constitutional Principles, supra note 1, at 34 ("Is there any such reason for submitting
the claims of two candidates for a judgeship to a popular vote? Do we expect or desire that our votes
should influence the decisions of a judge?").
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Abrahamson insists that an elected judge who is self-confident about decision-
making will not be shaped by public opinion because this would violate the
fundamental concepts of judging. She believes such an exercise would be
futile since judges cannot correctly determine the notorious cases, 10 7 and it is
difficult enough to make good decisions without considering public
opinion.108
Even if individual justices would, consciously or subconsciously, consider
the views (perceived or otherwise) of the electorate, the judicial election
provisions in Wisconsin may not allow this to have a significant impact on the
voting outcomes of the court as a whole.'0 9 The genius of the Wisconsin
Constitution is that no two justices are elected in the same year.'"0 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court justices are elected statewide with only one justice
running in any one year."' Thus, this minimizes the affect of any one given
justice who faces re-election in the next year (or two justices who will face re-
election in the following two years) on the voting outcome in any given year.
C. Do Factions Engage in Strategic Voting?
In testing whether the certain groupings of the court ("conformists" and
"non-conformist/moderates") have a tendency to change their voting patterns
as the justices in these groupings near re-election, the data confirms
Hypothesis One in respect to the "non-conformist" group of the court.
1 12
Thus, proximity to upcoming election promotes responsiveness to constituents
among those justices who otherwise would have a tendency to vote pro-
defendant. This differential may be seen among the "non-conformist" group
because the group is more likely to have preferences that are in conflict with
the preferences of their constituents. 1 3 The "non-conformist/moderate" group
is more likely to vote against a defendant's claim in the two years prior to re-
107. This may suggest that further research should be conducted by looking at only notorious
cases. This is more difficult in a state without the death penalty like Wisconsin. But, for example,
the data set could be trimmed to include only murder cases, those cases most in the news, or cases
that may result in long prison terms.
108. Abrahamson, supra note 2, at 984-85.
109. This claim should be empirically tested by looking at the changes in defendant "wins"
when certain individual justices change voting patterns (e.g., in later years of term or in appointed
terms) versus those periods when they do not.
110. See Wis. CONST. art. VII, § 4, cl. 1.
111. Id.
112. This, as well, essentially confirms the previous individual justice analysis, as Justice
Abrahamson, considering her number of years on the Court, has a large impact on the voting pattern
for the "non-conformist" grouping.
113. This is not necessarily to say personal preferences. The "non-conformist" grouping may




election. Interestingly, the "conformists" group may become more likely to
vote for a defendant's claim closer to election (although p = 0.07 > 0.05).
This may be because both groupings seek to gain more votes in re-election,
and, thus, need to move toward a more moderate and compromising voting
pattern in order to pick up votes from citizens of opposing views. 1 4 A more
likely story, however, is that usually "non-conformist" justices want to
decrease the risk that an opponent will draw attention to a vote that violates
public opinion as they near re-election.' 5 Meanwhile, the fact that
"conformist" judges are free from this worry is indicated by a statistically
insignificant percentage change in their voting patterns.
One could suggest doing further research to see whether the court is more
likely to reach a unanimous decision at certain times, or whether the voting
block expands as individual justices near re-election. However, this could not
be effectively done when studying the Wisconsin Supreme Court because
only one justice can face re-election each year1. 6 In many ways, this once
again acknowledges the effectiveness of the judicial election provision in the
Wisconsin Constitution"| 7 because the re-election separation among the
justices limits the impact of any one justice on the voting outcome (i.e. no
more than one justice would face re-election in the following year). In any
case, this analysis suggests that past research on state judiciaries and judicial
selection has neglected the necessary step of looking at voting pattern
differentials by possible different ideological factions of courts.
VIII. FURTHER ANALYSIS AND POSSIBLE FUTURE RESEARCH
Shortcomings with this type of research can only be alleviated through
future research. One could claim that any such results, when looking at
criminal cases, may only examine liberal justices responding to a conservative
public." 8 Future research may seek to look at other forms of response. For
example, research could track if the defendant actually wins cases when
114. This behavior of moving towards ideological moderation, or shifting ideological views in
the direction of a likely opponent has been shown to happen among legislators. Eiling, supra note
35, at 75; Thomas, supra note 35, at 96. This also suggests that the regression analysis evaluated in
Part VII.A may be benefited from the addition of an independent ideological variable.
115. See supra Part IV.
116. In Wisconsin, analysis would have to look at whether justices are more likely to vote with
the majority. This paper accomplishes this research as seen in Table 8 regressing MAJVOTE on
YRSELECT.
117. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
118. This may be a fair criticism considering the results found in Table 10 and the analysis in
Part VI.C. Chief Justice Abrahamson is the only justice on the court who more frequently than not
has voted for a defendant's claim, and who has voted on cases within the last two years of a term.
[87:323
VOTING AND ELECTORAL POLITICS
certain judges are closer to election. 119  One could look at tort or
discrimination cases. However, it is unclear what issues and specific cases the
public knows about and whether the public's lack of knowledge about the
courts affects the voting of justices. The justices, after all, may act only upon
perceived preferences or not consider public opinion at all. It is quite possible
that the public, at least in the justices' perception, does not view the majority
of criminal cases, as analyzed here, as important. Future research could
consider highly visible criminal cases or cases in which harsh sentences may
result.12
0
Notably, the data do not distinguish between a planned retirement versus a
loss in re-election as the cause of a justice's exit from the court. 121 Future re-
election plans may affect voting patterns. Also, one could take into account
whether a justice knows if he or she will be running for re-election unopposed
and when a justice becomes aware of any opposition. 122 Future research could
also consider the political parties of the justices or the race of the defendants.
IX. CONCLUSION
In choosing selection methods for state supreme court justices, states may
attempt to balance the conflicting ideals of judicial independence and
accountability. Unlike the federal process, which contains no electoral
mechanisms in order to maximize judicial independence, the Wisconsin
Constitution requires its judiciary to vie for citizen support in nonpartisan
elections. Do these elections undercut judicial independence by affecting the
ways justices vote? In examining all criminal cases decided by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court over a fifteen-year period, this Article concludes that being
appointed (versus elected) in the initial term has an extremely significant
119. This may confirm the effectiveness of the one supreme court judicial election per year
provision in the Wisconsin Constitution. It may also prove interesting to analyze actual voting
outcomes in states where members of a supreme court can face election simultaneously.
120. Although the death penalty is not used in Wisconsin, voting patterns in capital cases from
other states have indicated that elected judges may follow popular opinion in deciding these cases.
See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Can Judicial Independence Be Attained in the South? Overcoming
History, Election, and Misperceptions About the Role of the Judiciary, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 817
(1998); Stephen B. Bright, Elected Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas: Why Full Habeas Corpus
Review by Independent Federal Judges is Indispensable to Protecting Constitutional Rights, 78 TEX.
L. REV. 1806 (2000); Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death:
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759
(1995); Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to
Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308
(1997).
121. See supra note 89.
122. This could be empirically examined by comparing judicial voting patterns both before and
after the filing deadline of election papers with the state board of elections.
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impact on a justice's voting for a defendant's claim in his or her initial term,
suggesting that judicial selection methods impact strategic voting on the court.
Ultimately, however, it will prove difficult to answer the fundamental
question-which system, elective or appointment, actually promotes a better
judiciary? Research may shed light on whether different judicial selection
methods produce a different type of judiciary. 123
123. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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APPENDICES
In the z-Test tables in all the following appendices, "Variable 1" denotes
votes in the initial years of a term, and "Variable 2" denotes votes in the last
two years of a term. The mean is the number of times the tool was used
divided by the number of observations. The variance is the square of the
standard deviation. 124 Each z value is the number of standard deviations away
from the mean where z equals the observed difference minus the expected
difference, then divided by the standard error for difference.' 25 The p-value is
the observed significance level, which is the chance of getting a test statistic
as extreme as or more extreme than the observed one.
126
Appendix A
124. HUBERT M. BLALOCK, JR., SOCIAL STATISTICS, REVISED 80 (2d ed. 1979). For a detailed
explanation of analysis of variance (ANOVA), see GUDMUND R. IVERSEN & HELMUT NORPOTH,
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (2d ed. 1987).
125. FREEDMAN, supra note 77, at 524; THOMAS H. WONNACOTT & RONALD J. WONNACOTT,
INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS 127 (5th ed. 1990).
126. FREEDMAN, supra note 77, at 502.
z-Test: Two Sample for Means
Prosser
Variable I Variable 2
Mean 0.756757 0.762712






z Critical one-tail 1.644853
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.947674
z Critical two-tail 1.959963
z-Test: Two Sample for Means
Steinmetz
Variable 1 Variable 2
Mean 0.715385 0.810526






z Critical one-tail 1.644853
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.053101
z Critical two-tail 1.959963
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z-Test: Two Sample for Means
Geske
Variable 1 Variable 2
Mean 0.534884 0.553191






z Critical one-tail 1.644853
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.840726
z Critical two-tail 1.959963
z-Test: Two Sample for Means
Ceci
Variable 1 Variable 2
Mean 0.829114 0.782609






z Critical one-tail 1.644853
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.616797
z Critical two-tail 1.959963
z-Test: Two Sample for Means
Wilcox
Variable I Variable 2
Mean 0.769231 0.639344






z Critical one-tail 1.644853
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.055312
z Critical two-tail 1.959963
z-Test: Two Sample for Means
Day
Variable 1 Variable 2
Mean 0.792079 0.709091






z Critical one-tail 1.644853
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.223072
z Critical two-tail 1.959963
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z-Test: Two Sample for Means
Heffernan
Variable 1 Variable 2
Mean 0.593407 0.478261






z Critical one-tail 1.644853
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.165032
z Critical two-tail 1.959963
z-Test: Two Sample for Means
Bablitch
Variable I Variable 2
Mean 0.596774 0.547619






z Critical one-tail 1.644853
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.547983
z Critical two-tail 1.959963
z-Test: Two Sample for Means
Abrahamson
Variable I Variable 2
Mean 0.388316 0.604839






z Critical one-tail 1.644853
P(Z<=z) two-tail 3.79E-05
z Critical two-tail 1.959963
z-Test: Two Sample for Means
Callow
Variable I Variable 2
Mean 0.763359 0.807692






z Critical one-tail 1.644853
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.606691
z Critical two-tail 1.959963
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Appendix B
z-Test: Two Sample for Means
Conservatives
Variable 1 Variable 2
Mean 0.772246 0.7244444






z Critical one-tail 1.644853
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.145357
z Critical two-tail 1.959963
z-Test: Two Sample for Means
Liberals/Moderates
Combined
Variable 1 Variable 2
Mean 0.549275 0.629944






z Critical one-tail 1.644853
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.005381
z Critical two-tail 1.959963
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